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THE NEW FIDUCIARIES
Natalya Shnitser*

ABSTRACT
The regulation of employer-sponsored retirement plans in the United
States relies on fiduciary standards drawn from donative trust law to
regulate the conduct of those with authority or discretion over plan assets.
The mismatch between the trust-based fiduciary framework and the rights
and interests of employers and employees has contributed to the high cost
of pension fund investing and the significant gaps in pension coverage in
the private sector. In recent years, state and local governments have
stepped in to reduce the retirement coverage gap by creating statefacilitated retirement savings programs for private-sector workers who
lack access to employment-based coverage. In 2019, five states—
including California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Washington—
had programs open to participants.
This Symposium Essay shows that while the five programs vary in the
roles and responsibilities imposed on state actors and on the participating
employers, there is a notable shift away from traditional fiduciary
obligations as the primary constraint on the conduct of plan
administrators, particularly with respect to plan fees. In a stark departure
from the regulatory regime for plans sponsored by private-sector
employers, several states impose explicit caps on total fees that may be
charged to plan participants. Furthermore, while in some cases, the fee
caps are paired with traditional fiduciary obligations for state
administrators, in other cases the statutory provisions make no mention
of fiduciary duties. The Essay presents the benefits and the risks of the
new regulatory approaches and outlines a research agenda to assess the
effectiveness of fee caps as either a complement to or substitute for
existing fiduciary-based regulatory frameworks. The findings from the
state experiments in retirement plan governance will offer important
insights to policymakers seeking to improve retirement security in the
United States.

*David and Pamela Donohue Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
As concerns about the ability of millions of Americans to retire with
dignity and financial security continue to grow, state and local
governments are stepping in with new programs to facilitate saving by
private-sector workers without access to employer-sponsored retirement
plans.1 While each state program has unique features, the new programs
collectively signal an important shift in the roles of private employers,
employees, and states in the provision of retirement benefits. States are
taking increasingly active roles in the provision of retirement plans for

1. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-111SP, THE NATION’S
RETIREMENT SYSTEM: A COMPREHENSIVE RE-EVALUATION IS NEEDED TO BETTER PROMOTE FUTURE
RETIREMENT SECURITY 3 (2017) [hereinafter “GAO REPORT”], https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18111sp.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SVL-PHPG], (finding that “[t]raditional pensions have become much less
common, and individuals are increasingly responsible for planning and managing their own retirement
savings accounts, such as 401(k) plans. Yet research shows that many households are ill-equipped for this
task and have little or no retirement savings.”). The federal government also took steps to address
retirement security in 2019. In December of 2019, Congress passed the SECURE Act, which was signed
into law on December 20, 2019. Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act
(SECURE Act), incorporated into Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-94. Most
notably, the SECURE Act permits, for the first time, the pooling of unrelated employers in
“pooled employer plans” that may be sponsored and administered by third-party institutions—including
banks, insurance companies, recordkeepers or other commercial enterprises.
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private-sector workers, and in so doing, they are experimenting not only
with elements of plan design but also with features of plan governance.2
Whereas fiduciary standards are at the core of the regulatory regime for
employer-sponsored private-sector retirement plans, this Essay
documents the states’ embrace of fee rules to address shortcomings of
existing plans. The Essay is organized as follows: Part I describes the
limitations of the current retirement system that have prompted the state
interventions, including the reluctance of smaller businesses to establish
retirement plans and the prevalence of high fees among existing
employer-sponsored plans. Part II describes the evolution of the
regulatory regime under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (“ERISA”) and the centrality of fiduciary standards in the regime
as it applies to defined-contribution retirement plans. Part III introduces
the state programs that aim to expand access to retirement-savings plans.
Of the programs currently open to participants, the ones in California,
Illinois, and Oregon require employers that do not otherwise sponsor a
retirement plan for their employees to automatically enroll the employees
in Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”) overseen by the states. In
contrast, Washington has established a marketplace where smaller
employers can select retirement plans that have been pre-screened by the
state, while Massachusetts now serves as the plan sponsor of a multipleemployer plan (“MEP”) for smaller non-profit organizations. Part IV
reviews the key governance provisions for each state program and
highlights the significant departures from the existing trust-based ERISA
fiduciary framework. Part IV argues that the particular permutations of
regulatory features in the new state programs present a unique opportunity
to evaluate the effectiveness of fiduciary obligations and fee caps in
retirement savings plans. The Essay concludes by considering how the
lessons from the new state programs may reshape the U.S. retirement
system in the long run.
I. THE RETIREMENT COVERAGE GAP IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Only two-thirds of private-sector workers have access to employersponsored plans.3 U.S. law does not require employers to sponsor any
2. See generally Kathryn L. Moore, State Automatic Enrollment IRAs After the Trump Election:
Are They Preempted by ERISA?, 27 ELDER L.J. 51 (2019); Kathryn L. Moore, Closing the Retirement
Savings Gap: Are State Automatic Enrollment IRAs the Answer?, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 35 (2016);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Retirement in the Land of Lincoln: The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act,
2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 173 (2016); Ctr. for Ret. Initiatives, McCourt Sch. of Pub. Policy, Georgetown Univ.,
State Facilitated Retirement Savings Programs: A Snapshot of Plan Design Features, State Brief-19-03,
(Dec. 31, 2019), https://cri.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/States_SnapShotPlanDesign63-19FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM9S-2MFV].
3. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
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retirement savings plans. Many employers—particularly smaller
employers—commonly cite the lack of administrative resources and the
expenses associated with retirement plans as factors that discourage plan
formation.4
Among employees who do have access to an employer-sponsored plan,
there is significant variation in plan quality. Beyond variation in the
magnitude of the employer contributions, plans vary in the amount of
administrative fees charged to plan participants, the types of individual
investment options available on the plan “menus” and the costs associated
with such investment options.5 High fees and poorly constructed
investment menus—both of which have been particularly prevalent in
smaller employer plans—can have devastating effects on the ability of
plan participants to save for retirement through defined contribution
plans.6 In some cases, researchers have documented that “the additional
fees from poorly constructed plan menus have eliminated the preferential
tax treatment afforded to 401(k) plans.”7
In recent years, as defined contribution plans have assumed a central
role in the U.S. retirement system, retirement plan fees, expenses, and
investment options have garnered the attention of markets participants,

4. Employer Barriers to and Motivations for Offering Retirement Benefits, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS (2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/06/employerbarriers-to-and-motivations-for-offering-retirement-benefits [https://perma.cc/7D7N-LT8T] (showing
that “[m]ost commonly, employers without plans said that starting a retirement plan is too expensive to
set up (37 percent). Another 22 percent cited a lack of administrative resources.”); see also, GAO REPORT,
supra note 1, at 23 (noting that workers employed by “smaller firms and in certain industries are less
likely to have access” to retirement savings programs).
5. An employer sponsoring a 401(k) retirement plan must navigate and oversee a myriad of fees.
The largest component of plan fees is generally associated with managing plan investments. In addition,
there are also administrative costs of establishing and operating the plans. These include the provision of
recordkeeping (maintaining plan records, processing employee contributions and distributions, and
issuing account statements to employees), accounting, reporting, audit, legal, and trustee services. See
generally DELOITTE CONSULTING, INV. CO. INST., INSIDE THE STRUCTURE OF DEFINED
CONTRIBUTION/401(K) PLAN FEES, 2013: A STUDY ASSESSING THE MECHANICS OF THE ‘ALL-IN’ FEE
(2014), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_14_dc_401k_fee_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6B7Y-HN9B]; SEAN
COLLINS ET AL., INV. CO. INST., THE ECONOMICS OF PROVIDING 401(K) PLANS: SERVICES, FEES, AND
EXPENSES, 2016, ICI Research Perspective Vol. 23, no. 4 (June 2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/per2304.pdf [https://perma.cc/76M3-Z8VE].
6. James Kwak, Improving Retirement Savings Options for Employees, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 483
(2013) (describing the problems of problems of “high mutual fund fees and poor fund selection” in
retirement plans); Impact of Plan Size on Workers’ Retirement Income Adequacy, EMP. BENEFITS RES.
INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://ebriorg.wordpress.com/2018/04/06/impact-of-plan-size-on-workersretirement-income-adequacy/ [https://perma.cc/6GE6-5MG5] (reporting that “participants can experience
significantly greater increases [in retirement income adequacy] by simply benefiting from the economies
of scale of large versus small plans”).
7. See Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive
Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1476, 1501 (2015) (noting that “[t]he
problem of fees is especially acute in small plans, where there is less competition and fewer resources are
likely to be devoted by the plan sponsor to administering the plan.”).
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the Department of Labor8 and plaintiffs’ attorneys.9 The fee disparities
have precipitated a host of lawsuits claiming that plan sponsors and
service providers violated their fiduciary obligations by, for example,
offering more expensive actively managed funds instead of index funds,10
offering more expensive retail class funds instead of institutional class
funds,11 failing to properly monitor record-keeping fees,12 and including
hedge fund, private equity investments,13 or “proprietary” funds
associated with the plan sponsor.14 While the long-term consequences of
the fiduciary litigation are not yet known,15 the litigation over plan fees
has revealed the current system’s reliance on trust-based fiduciary
obligations as the primary constraint on the conduct of plan sponsors and
those with discretion or control over plan assets. The current reliance
would surprise the original drafters of ERISA. The next Part explains how
8. Moore, Closing the Retirement Savings Gap, supra note 2, at 69 (observing that “[b]ecause
plan fees can have such a significant impact on retirement savings, 401(k) plan fees has been the subject
of considerable scrutiny in recent years. The Department of Labor has issued a series of regulations
mandating fee disclosure, and plan participants have filed a host of lawsuits claiming that excessive plan
fees violate ERISA's fiduciary provisions.”).
9. See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, The Lawyer on a Quest to Lower Your 401(k) Fees, WALL ST. J.,
(June
9,
2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-lawyer-on-a-quest-to-lower-your-401-k-fees1497000607; Dilroop Sidhu et al., Plan Sponsor Fee Litigation Cases on the Rise, WASH. WATCH 18
(2017),
https://www.groom.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/1888_WashingtonWatch_Fall_2017_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9XW-NKGC]; George S. Mellman & Geoffrey T.
Sanzenbacher, 401(K) Lawsuits: What Are the Causes and Consequences?, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH
BOSTON COLL., Issue in Brief No. 18-8 (May 2018), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/IB_188.pdf [https://perma.cc/HM5Q-4CKB] (listing 420 ERISA cases on “Inappropriate Investments,
Excessive Fees, and/or Self-dealing” filed between 2006 and January of 2018).
10. See, e.g., Taylor v. United Techs. Corp., 354 F. App’x 525 (2d Cir. 2009).
11. See, e.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523 (2015); Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327 (8th
Cir. 2014).
12. See, e.g., Tibble, 575 U.S. at 523.
13. See, e.g., Sulyma v. Intel Corp. Inv. Policy Comm., 140 S.Ct. 768 (2020).
14. See, e.g., Leber v. Citigroup, Inc., 48 EB Cases (BNA) 2418 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2010); Gipson
v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 149 (D.D.C. 2008); Mehling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 246 F.R.D.
467 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2007); Dupree v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 42 EB Cases (BNA) 1510 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 7, 2007); Franklin v. First Union Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 720 (E.D. Va. 2000).
15. The growth of fiduciary litigation has been associated with a downward trend in 401(k) fees,
although it is one of multiple factors that has contributed to decreases in certain kinds of plan fees in some
plans. See, e.g., Quinn Curtis, Costs, Conflicts, and College Savings: Evaluating Section 529 Savings
Plans 37 YALE J. ON REG. 116, 132 (2020) (noting that “[c]lass-action lawsuits alleging breaches of
fiduciary duty are not uncommon and have had a significant effect on lowering the fees associated with
401(k) plans”), https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1550&context=yjreg
[https://perma.cc/9K99-ZDUQ]. While certain fees are lower than they were fifteen years ago, there is
concern that the fear of fiduciary litigation may discourage plan formation and stifle experimentation with
plan design and features. Mellman & Sanzenbacher, supra note 9 (finding that “[o]n the investment side,
the average share of assets paid to fees for 401(k) participants in mutual funds has declined over the last
15 years….and these declines have been accompanied by corresponding decreases in 401(k)
administrative and recordkeeping costs” but expressing concern that “the fear of litigation prevents the
use of creative options that may improve participant outcomes – like investment vehicles designed to
provide a lifetime income stream when participants retire.”).
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a regime so replete with rules at its inception came to rely so heavily on
the fiduciary standard to protect participants in employer-sponsored
retirement plans.
II. THE LIMITS OF FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE AND THE CURRENT
REGULATORY REGIME

Trust law’s central role in the governance of employer-sponsored
defined-contribution retirement plans was not intentional. The drafting
of ERISA predated the rise of 401(k) plans. At the time of the drafting,
defined benefit pension plans were the norm. Employers generally
promised monthly pension checks for retired employees, and also bore
the risk and responsibility of setting aside and managing the money to
pay for such benefits. When the drafters of ERISA borrowed from
donative trust law in the 1970s, they did so for the limited purpose of
curbing asset mismanagement by insiders with access to pension
funds.16 But trust law was just one piece of ERISA’s protective regime.
The drafters also imposed extensive vesting, funding, and insurance
requirements to regulate employer conduct in the provision and
administration of defined benefit pension plans.
Trust law—and particularly the fiduciary regime—assumed a much
greater governance role as the pension system changed in the decades
after ERISA’s passage. As defined contribution plans began to replace
defined benefit plans in the private sector, many of ERISA’s
substantive provisions—particularly those related to funding and
insurance—became simply irrelevant to the new plans. At the same
time, defined contribution plans increasingly exposed employee
participants to risks stemming from the plan administration and
investment selection decisions of their employers, risks that did not
exist in the same way for participants in defined benefit plans. In the
absence of new substantive federal regulation, the trust-based
fiduciary regime became the centerpiece of 401(k) plan governance
under ERISA. Consequently, current regulation aims to protect U.S.
employees primarily by subjecting those who administer private
pension plans to trust-based care and loyalty obligations.
As observers have noted, reliance on the fiduciary regime presents
several challenges in the context of the non-donative, dual-settlor,
dual-beneficiary arrangement that is the modern 401(k) plan.17 First,
16. Daniel R. Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1988).
17. In the prototypical donative trust, an owner of property, called the settlor, desires to gift the
property to one or more beneficiaries. Instead of giving a direct gift to the beneficiary, the settlor desires
to have the property managed by a third party trustee. The settlor transfers to the trustee the legal title to
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the current fiduciary regime perpetuates ERISA’s fiction about the
employer’s ability to wear and switch between two “hats.” The
“settlor” hat permits the employer to consider its own interests in
establishing, designing, and terminating a plan, and courts have
prevented the application of ERISA’s fiduciary regime to actions
falling within this increasingly broad category.18 The “fiduciary” hat
requires the same employer, when acting as a fiduciary to the plan, to
act solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries.19 The
obligations associated with the fiduciary hat arise when employers
administer what is a form of employee compensation, even though
other forms of compensation place employers and employees in an
adversarial position with one another.20 Although ERISA does not
require employers to wear the fiduciary hat when setting plan terms,
in practice, the line between settlor and fiduciary decisions is
inherently murky.21 Certain “settlor” design decisions have the same
financial effects as “fiduciary” implementation or administration
decisions. For example, employers can freely choose to offer less
generous contributions or not to pay for certain administrative costs of
the plan (settlor decisions). Yet, they may not, under the current
fiduciary regime, take employer costs into consideration when
selecting service providers or investment menu options for plan
participants (fiduciary decisions).
The reliance on the trust-based analogy also has given the courts
the property. Consequently, the settlor’s rights with respect to the trust property terminate, the trustee
obtains legal control, and the beneficiary gets an equitable interest. To safeguard the beneficiary from
trustee wrongdoing, trust law subjects the trustees to strict fiduciary obligations of loyalty and prudence.
Non-donative trust arrangements—including pension plans—deviate significantly from these
characteristics. The traditional settlor, trustee, and beneficiary roles do not map well onto modern defined
contribution arrangements; instead, in the current retirement plan context, both employers and employees
take on elements of each role. See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an
Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 169 (1997); John H. Langbein, The Conundrum of Fiduciary
Investing under ERISA, in PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY
SECURITIES 128, 129-32 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1989); Norman Stein, Trust Law and Pension Plans, in
PENSION RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROXY VOTING OF PENSION PLAN EQUITY SECURITIES 1, 52 (Dan M.
McGill ed., 1989); see also Natalya Shnitser, Trusts No More: Rethinking the Regulation of Retirement
Savings in the United States, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 629, 629-30 (2016).
18. Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Untrustworthy: ERISA's Eroded Fiduciary Law, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1007, 1011 (2018) (describing how “[t]he settlor function doctrine . . . “restrict[s] the range of
application of ERISA’s fiduciary regime . . .”).
19. Nonneutral trustees must make their decisions “with an eye single to the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries” but are not at fault if particular decisions “incidentally” benefit the
corporation. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
20. See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1257, 1296 (2016) (suggesting that “the employer is presumptively the employee’s adversary” when
negotiating the terms of employee benefits).
21. See Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA
Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459 (2015) (providing a comprehensive analysis of the
settlor/fiduciary doctrine).
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considerable latitude to determine the scope of prudent and loyal
conduct by plan fiduciaries.22 Courts have grappled with the reality
that employers may terminate existing plans or hesitate to form new
ones if they believe that the compliance costs or litigation risks are too
high.23 The reach of fiduciary obligations in the context of retirement
plans has been constrained by employer threats to cease offering plans
to their employees.24 In applying the trust analogy, courts have
emphasized the employers’ role as trust settlors, affording them
significant deference in setting the scope of “trustee” authority to
administer the trust and interpret its terms.25 Over time,
“uncoordinated, low-visibility judicial decisions” have “radically
pruned back” both “the scope and the intensity of fiduciary
oversight.”26
Finally, ERISA’s fiduciary-centric regime may have had the
perverse result of decreasing participants’ monitoring of plan
sponsors. By imposing the “fiduciary” label on employers, ERISA
may, in effect, mask the employers’ conflicts of interest and lack of
expertise.27 At the same time, even if employees were more vigilant,
their enforcement options are limited because litigation is itself costly
22. See, e.g., Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 575 U.S. 523, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015) (finding that the
court has “often noted that an ERISA fiduciary’s duty is ‘derived from the common law of trusts.’”)
(quoting Central States, Southeast & Sourthwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 570 (1985)).
23. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 524
(2004) (stating that “employers’ decisions to maintain and establish defined contribution plans are
voluntary; if the costs of such plans outweigh the perceived benefits, employers will abandon such plans
or will not establish them in the first place.”).
24. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (finding that “courts may have to
take account of competing congressional purposes, such as Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced
protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so
complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering
welfare benefit plans in the first place.”).
25. The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rinciples of the law of trusts . . . establish that a denial of
benefits . . . must be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan expressly gives the plan
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
plan’s terms, in which cases a deferential standard of review is appropriate.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
v. Bruch 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989) (emphasis added). Plans’ sponsors have guaranteed the deferential
standard of review by granting the required discretion to the plan administrators. See generally John H.
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207 (1991).
26. Wiedenbeck, supra note 18, at 1007. (“The trust law analogy has come to dominate judicial
thinking about employee benefit plans. Yet despite its rise to rhetorical prominence, ERISA fiduciary law
has been dramatically transformed by a series of uncoordinated, low-visibility judicial decisions on
multiple fronts. These apparently unconnected case law developments reveal a startling pattern of
mutually reinforcing restrictions on ERISA's protection of pension and welfare benefits. . . . Both the
scope and the intensity of fiduciary oversight have been radically pruned back in the courts.”).
27. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 900 (2011)
(warning that an overbroad application of fiduciary duties “could unnecessarily constrain parties from
self-protection in contractual relationships, impose excessive litigation costs, provide an unsuitable basis
for contracting, and impede developing fiduciary norms of behavior.”).
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and requires employees to overcome significant free-rider and
coordination problems.28 Apart from employee litigation or agency
oversight, retirement plan participants have no meaningful recourse.
As the trust “beneficiaries,” they are effectively locked in to their
employer plans and unable to access alternative investment options
without losing the tax benefits associated with employer-sponsored
plans.29 Meanwhile, as described in Part I, because many private U.S.
employers do not offer any retirement benefits to their employees,
some forty million workers are without access to an employersponsored plan.30
III. STATE EFFORTS TO CLOSE THE COVERAGE GAP
Over the last decade, numerous states have begun to explore and
implement programs to expand access to retirement savings benefits for
private-sector employees. Because the state programs depend on
employer intermediaries, they have had to grapple with the issue of
ERISA preemption.31 Although the Department of Labor created a safe
harbor for such programs in 2016,32 Congress used the Congressional
Review Act to overturn the agency rule in 2017. President Trump signed
28. The class action and contingent fee mechanisms, though used against certain large employers,
may not be as effective for smaller employers where aggregate recoveries would be smaller. See Robert
Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 621, 679 (2004) (observing that “[w]hen
liability rules are the chief check on agency costs, there is a practical limit to the number of residual
claimants that the organization can support. The greater the number, the more serious the collective action
dynamic that will weaken any individual’s incentive to monitor and, if cost justified, to litigate.”).
29. See, e.g., Liam Pleven, How to Lobby for a Better 401(k), WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-lobby-for-a-better-401-k-1424459507 (observing that while “many
plans are hobbled by high fees and inadequate choices . . . . Few people want to question the judgment of
people who sign their paycheck and control promotions and raises.”).
30. 51 Percent of Private Industry Workers Had Access to Only Defined Contribution Retirement
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS:
ECON.
DAILY
(Oct.
2,
2018),
Plans,
BUREAU
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2018/51-percent-of-private-industry-workers-had-access-to-only-definedcontribution-retirement-plans-march-2018.htm [https://perma.cc/C4SG-FYU7] (reporting that as of
“March 2018, 51 percent of private industry workers had access to only defined contribution retirement
plans through their employer”).
31. Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Section 4(a) of ERISA provides that ERISA
generally applies to any “employee benefit plan” established or maintained by an employer “engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce” or any plan established or maintained by
unions representing employees engaged in commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). If any state program is found
to establish employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA, ERISA would preempt the state law creating
the program.
32. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to State Savings Programs That Sponsor or Facilitate Plans
Covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71936-02 (U.S. Dep’t
of Labor Nov. 18, 2015) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509). Under the final regulation, state automatic
enrollment IRAs would not have constituted employee benefit plans for purposes of ERISA if they met
eleven stated requirements.
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the Congressional resolution into law on May 17, 2017, and the
Department of Labor withdrew the regulatory safe harbor a month later.33
Despite the ongoing questions and litigation over ERISA preemption,
state and local governments have moved forward with new programs. By
2019, the five programs described below were all open to participants.34
In March 2020, a federal district court in California ruled that California's
Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program is not preempted by
ERISA.35 The decision supports the states’ position on preemption and is
expected to accelerate the growth of additional state-sponsored retirement
programs for private-sector employees.36
A. State Automatic Enrollment Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
1. The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Program
In 2012, the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act37
created the mandate and the institutional body to study the feasibility of
an automatic enrollment program for California. After the feasibility
analysis was completed in January of 2016, legislation was approved to
begin developing the program. The CalSavers Retirement Savings
Program was piloted in 2018, and then launched it statewide in July of
2019.38 As stated in the program materials, the “CalSavers Retirement
Savings Program was designed to give employers an easy way to help
their employees save for retirement, with no employer fees, no fiduciary
responsibility, and minimal ongoing responsibilities.”39
Pursuant to the law, California employers who do not already offer a
“qualified” employer-sponsored retirement plan and who have five or
33. Moore, State Automatic Enrollment IRAs, supra note 2, at 53, 63-64.
34. Experts have disagreed whether, in the absence of the safe-harbor initially promulgated by the
Department of Labor the state programs in California, Illinois and Oregon are preempted by ERISA.
Several lawsuits have been filed claiming preemption and the litigation is ongoing. Id. at 66-67.
35. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Cal. Secure Choice Ret. Sav. Program, 2020 BL 89150
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) (finding that “CalSavers is neither an employee benefit plan nor does it relate
to an ERISA plan” and thus it is not preempted by ERISA).
36. See, e.g., Hazel Bradford, More States Jumping onto Secure Choice Bandwagon, PENS. & INV.,
Mar. 23, 2020.
37. California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust Act, CAL GOV’T CODE §§ 100000-100044
(West 2018).
38. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100004 (West 2018)(“There is hereby established a retirement savings
trust known as the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust to be administered by the board
for the purpose of promoting greater retirement savings for California private employees in a convenient,
voluntary, low-cost, and portable manner. After sufficient funds are made available for this title to be
operative, the California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust, as a self-sustaining trust, shall pay all
costs of administration only out of moneys on deposit therein.”).
39. Help your employees save for retirement, CALSAVERS, https://employer.calsavers.com/
[https://perma.cc/2CT2-7AZQ].
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more employees must either sponsor a retirement plan or participate in
the CalSavers program.40 Under CalSavers, the role of the employer is to
facilitate payroll contributions into their employees’ Roth IRA accounts.
Employees are automatically enrolled in the program with a current
default savings rate of 5% of gross pay.41 Employees can change the
savings rate and opt out of (and back into) the program at any time.42
Employers cannot make contributions to employee accounts.43
The California Secure Choice Retirement Savings Investment Board
implements and oversees the program and selects investment options
available to individual participants.44 The nine-member board, which is
chaired by the State Treasurer, includes the Treasurer, the Director of
Finance, the Controller, an individual with retirement savings and
investment expertise appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules, an
employee representative appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly, a
small business representative appointed by the Governor, a public
member appointed by the Governor, and two additional members
appointed by the Governor.45 Day-to-day program operations are
currently handled by Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services,
LLC (“ACSR”). The statute states explicitly that the “program is a stateadministered program, not an employer-sponsored program,” that
“employers shall not have any liability” for any employee participation or
investment decisions, and that “employers shall not be a fiduciary, or
considered to be a fiduciary” over the program.46
2. Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program
The Illinois plan and the California plan have many similar features.
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act established the state’s
program to help employees who do not have access to a retirement
savings plan through work save for retirement through Roth IRAs.47 The
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100032 (West 2018).
41. Although the statutory provision set the default contribution rate at 3% of wages, it authorized
the California Investment Board to adjust the default rate to between 2% and 5%. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
100032(i), (j) (West 2018). Subsequent regulations set the initial default contribution rate to 5% with
automatic escalation of 1% each year until it reaches 8%. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 10005 (2018).
42. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032(f) (West 2018).
43. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100032 (West 2018).
44. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100002 (West 2018).
45. Id.
46. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 100034 (West 2018).
47. Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1-95 (2018); ILL.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 74, § 721.100 (2018) (“The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program is a retirement
savings program in the form of an automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRA for the purpose of
promoting greater retirement savings for private-sector employees in a convenient, low-cost, and portable
manner.”).
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Illinois Secure Choice Savings Program requires employers who have
twenty-five or more employees, have been in operation for at least two
years, and do not offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan to facilitate
Illinois Secure Choice.48 In their facilitator role, employers provide the
information to establish payroll deductions; they do not incur any fees or
make any contributions to the accounts of participating employers. The
statute disavows any fiduciary obligations for participating employers.49
As in the California program, the current default savings rate is 5% of
gross pay and employees can opt out (or back in) at any time.50
The Illinois Secure Choice Savings Board implements and oversees the
program, selects the investment options available to individual
participants, and serves as the trustee of the Illinois Secure Choice
Savings Program Fund.51 The Illinois Secure Choice Board has seven
members: the State Treasurer; the State Comptroller; the Director of the
Governor’s Office of Management and Budget; two public
representatives with expertise in retirement savings plan administration
or investment, or both, appointed by the Governor; a representative of
participating employers, appointed by the Governor; and a representative
of enrollees, appointed by the Governor.52 Ascensus College Savings
Recordkeeping Services, LLC (“ACSR”) currently serves as the program
administrator. ACSR and its affiliates are responsible for day-to-day
program operations.53
3. Oregon Retirement Savings Plan
In 2015, Oregon established the Oregon Retirement Savings Board and
48. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 74, § 721.200 (2018) (establishing that “employer” for purposes of the
Illinois Secure Choice program is defined as “a person or entity engaged in a business, industry,
profession, trade, or other enterprise in Illinois, whether for profit or not for profit, that: has at no time
during the previous calendar year employed fewer than 25 employees in the State; has been in business at
least 2 years; and has not offered a qualified retirement plan in the preceding 2 years.”).
49. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/75 (2018) (stating that “[p]articipating employers shall not
have any liability for an employee's decision to participate in, or opt out of, the Program or for the
investment decisions of the Board or of any enrollee” and further clarifying that “[a] participating
employer shall not be a fiduciary, or considered to be a fiduciary, over the Program. A participating
employer shall not bear responsibility for the administration, investment, or investment performance of
the Program. A participating employer shall not be liable with regard to investment returns, Program
design, and benefits paid to Program participants.”).
50. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/55 (2018). Illinois law charges the Illinois Board with selecting
a default contribution rate between 3% and 6% of wages. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/30 (2018). The
default contribution was set at 5%. See Contributions, ILL. SECURE CHOICE,
https://saver.ilsecurechoice.com/home/savers/contributions.html [https://perma.cc/C9UF-ABDX].
51. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/30 (2018).
52. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/20 (2018).
53. A New Choice for Retirement Savings, ILL. SECURE CHOICE, https://www.ilsecurechoice.com/
(last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
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charged it with developing the Oregon Retirement Savings Plan for
Oregon employees.54 The program, which went into effect in 2017,
requires all employers to participate unless they certify to the state that
they offer an alternative qualified retirement plan.55 As in California and
Illinois, employers in Oregon serve only to facilitate contributions via
payroll deductions, which are then deposited into employees’ Roth IRA
or IRA accounts.56 The Oregon Retirement Savings Board has set the
default contribution rate at 5% with auto-escalation at the rate of an
additional 1% each year until a maximum contribution of 10% is
reached.57
The Oregon Retirement Savings Board oversees the program and
selects the investment options available to individual participants.58 The
Board has seven members: the State Treasurer; four members appointed
by the Governor, including a representative of employers, a representative
with experience in investments, a representative of an association
representing employees, and a member of the public who is retired; a
member of the Oregon House of Representatives; and a member of the
Oregon Senate.59 Ascensus College Savings Recordkeeping Services,
LLC is the program administrator responsible for day-to-day program
operations.60
B. State-Facilitated Marketplace Model
1. Washington's Small Business Retirement Marketplace
Washington’s Small Business Retirement Marketplace is built on the
premise that “small businesses, which employ more than forty percent of
private-sector employees in Washington, often choose not to offer
retirement plans to employees due to concerns about costs, administrative
burdens, and potential liability that they believe such plans would place

54. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 178.200-178.245 (West 2018).
55. Or. Admin. R. 170-080-0015. Notably, the program explicitly aims to “[k]eep administration
fees in the plan low” and will “[n]ot impose any duties under the [ERISA] . . . on employers.” OR. REV.
STAT. § 178.210 (2018).
56. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0035. For further analysis of how employers have carried out their
roles, see Anek Belbase, Laura D. Quinby & Geoffrey T. Sanzenbacher, Auto-IRA Rollout Gradually
Speeding Up, B.C. CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. 20-5 (2020), available at https://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/IB_20-5..pdf.
57. OR. ADMIN. R. 170-080-0035 (2018).
58. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.205 (West 2018).
59. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.200 (West 2018).
60. OregonSaves is open to everyone, OREGONSAVES, https://www.oregonsaves.com
[https://perma.cc/RC6W-VSXV].
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on their business.”61 Legislation enacting the program was passed in
2015, and the marketplace formally opened in March of 2018.62 In effect,
the Retirement Marketplace is a website where individuals and employers
“can comparison shop for state-verified, low-cost retirement savings
plans.”63 Participation in the Retirement Marketplace is entirely voluntary
for both employers and employees. The plans offered through the website,
which can include various IRAs, 401(k)s, and certain life insurance
products designed for retirement purposes, must be first verified and
approved by Washington State officials at the Department of Financial
Institutions or the Office of the Insurance Commissioner to ensure they
comply with Retirement Marketplace requirements.64 The plans on the
marketplace cannot charge administrative fees to employers and, subject
to limited exceptions, they cannot charge enrollees more than 1% in total
annual administrative fees.65 Furthermore, the plans must go through an
annual renewal process to ensure the plan and provider remain in good
standing.66
The marketplace currently offers a profit-sharing plan and four types
of 401(k) plans from Saturna Trust Company, as well as a Roth and a
traditional IRA option from Finhabits.67 Because the marketplace merely
lists plan options, the state has no ERISA liability and does not assume
any of the employer’s legal responsibilities. Employers, meanwhile,
retain any ERISA obligations that would normally apply, albeit with the
benefit of having the plans pre-screened and monitored by state
agencies.68 The marketplace enables employers to decide which type of
61. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.730 (West 2018).
62. Washington Small Business Retirement Marketplace Act, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.330.730-750 (West 2018).
63. The Marketplace, RET. MARKETPLACE, https://retirement-marketplace.com/the-marketplace/
[https://perma.cc/78VA-K7NX]. Per the statute, the “‘Washington small business retirement marketplace’
or ‘marketplace’ means the retirement savings program created to connect eligible employers and their
employees with approved plans to increase retirement savings.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.732
(West 2018).
64. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.735 (West 2018).
65. Id. Notably, as set forth in the applicable regulations, “a financial services firm may charge
retirement plan enrollees a de minimis fee for new and/or low balance accounts in excess of one hundred
basis points in total annual fees only if the department of commerce and the financial services firm
negotiate and agree upon the amount of the de minimis fee prior to the issuance of the verification letter.”
WASH. ADMIN. CODE 208-710-030.
66. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 208-710-060 (2018) (setting forth the annual renewal application
procedure).
67. Available Plans, RETIREMENT MARKETPLACE, https://retirement-marketplace.com/availableplans/ [https://perma.cc/C5EE-RJDJ].
68. The statute provides that “The department shall not expose the state of Washington as an
employer or through administration of the marketplace to any potential liability under the federal
employee retirement income [security] act of 1974.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.742 (West 2018).
At the same time, the statute emphasizes the benefits of ERISA protections. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
43.330.730 (West 2018) (“The marketplace furthers greater retirement plan access for the residents of
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plan best meets their and their employees’ needs, including whether they
prefer an ERISA-covered plan.
C. State-Administered Multiple-Employer Plan
1. Massachusetts Defined Contribution CORE Plan
In 2012, Massachusetts created the Connecting Organizations to
Retirement (CORE) Plan, which aims to help Massachusetts nonprofit
employees save and invest for a financially secure retirement.69 The
program, which launched in 2017, is a voluntary 401(k) multiple
employer plan that smaller non-profits may choose to adopt. 70 The Office
of the State Treasurer and Receiver General is the sponsor of the CORE
Plan and assumes most administrative and investment responsibilities,
thus reducing the burden on participating not-for-profit employers.71 Plan
materials indicate that for employers, the CORE Plan “relieves much of
the fiduciary responsibility” that the employer would otherwise have by
utilizing an outside plan.72
The plan currently provides for a default employee contribution of 6%
with annual auto-escalation of 1% or 2%, based on the employer election,
until a maximum contribution 12%.73 The employer may elect to make
contributions.74 The state, as the plan sponsor, has outsourced various
elements of plan administration. For example, Empower Retirement
serves as the plan’s recordkeeper;75 Aon Hewitt serves as the Investment
Manager, and is tasked with developing and monitoring the investment
structure of the CORE Plan;76 and Northeast Professional Planning Group
Fiduciary Services (NPPG-FS) is the Plan Administrator that performs
administrative fiduciary services to ensure operational and administrative
Washington while ensuring that individuals participating in these retirement plans will have all the
protections offered by the employee retirement income security act.”).
69. Qualified defined contribution plan for employees of not-for-profit employer, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 29, § 64E (West 2018).
70. Id. (“In order to participate in the plan, a not-for-profit employer shall execute a participation
agreement, agree to the terms of the plan and operate the plan in compliance with the Code and ERISA.”).
71. 960 MASS. CODE REGS. 6.02 (2018) (“The State Treasurer shall be the MEP Sponsor unless
otherwise specified.”).
72. Professional
Oversight,
CORE,
https://www.empowerretirement.com/client/mass/employer/professional-oversight.html [https://perma.cc/9QNR-CBQE].
73. Plan
overview,
CORE
1,
https://www.empowerretirement.com/client/mass/employer/resources/pdf/CORE-Plan-Adoption-Brochure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DV9B-LPSU].
74. Id. at 2 (The employer may choose to make either a “Safe Harbor Employer-Matching
Contribution” or a “Safe Harbor Non-Elective Contribution.”).
75. Id. at 3, 5.
76. Id. at 3.
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compliance.77 At present, program materials indicate that there is a sixtyfive dollar annual fee for participation in the CORE Plan that is
automatically deducted from each participant’s account. Furthermore,
there are certain elective plan features that may have additional fees, and
“each investment option has an administrative, advisory and investment
management fee that varies by investment option.”78
IV. FIDUCIARIES WITH FEE CAPS: EXPERIMENTS IN PLAN GOVERNANCE
The new state programs respond directly to the coverage and fee
challenges in the current system. Each seeks to expand access to lowercost retirement savings options, particularly for workers employed by
smaller employers who are otherwise unlikely to take on the risk and
responsibility of establishing and administering employer-sponsored
plans. Beyond the common goal, however, the five state programs
currently open to participants vary in the degree of responsibility assigned
to the state and the employer, and in the approach to controlling plan
fees.79 Table 1 below summarizes the key fiduciary provisions for state
actors and for the participating employers under each plan. It also tracks
any statutory or regulatory ceilings or restrictions on plan fees. Following
the description of the key fiduciary and fee provisions in each state, this
Part creates a typology of regulatory approaches embodied in the five
programs, and the lessons that can be gleaned by comparing different sets
of programs to one another.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 5.
79. As observers have acknowledged, there is no guarantee that the state programs themselves will
not suffer governance or oversight challenges. See, e.g., Moore, State Automatic Enrollment IRAs, supra
note 2 at 93 (stating that “[o]f course, there is a risk of mismanagement by the entities charged with
managing and administering the programs”); Moore, Closing the Retirement Savings Gap, supra note 2
at 69 (noting that in “recent years, plan fees paid by public sector pension funds have come under
increasing scrutiny”).
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Table 1: Fiduciary & Fee Provisions Across State-Administered
Retirement Savings Programs for Private-Sector Employees
State

CA

Fiduciary Provisions, If Any, for
State Actors

“The board and the program
administrator and staff, including
contracted administrators and
consultants, shall discharge their
duties as fiduciaries with respect to
the trust solely in the interest of the
program participants as follows:
(1) For the exclusive purposes of
providing benefits to program
participants and defraying
reasonable expenses of
administering the program.
(2) By investing with the care,
skill, prudence, and diligence under
the circumstances then prevailing
that a prudent person acting in a
like capacity and familiar with
those matters would use in the
conduct of an enterprise of a like
character and with like aims.” CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 100002 (d) (West
2018).

Fiduciary
Provisions, If
Any, for
Participating
Employers
No fiduciary
obligations for
participating
employers. CAL.
GOV’T CODE §
100034 (West
2018).
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Fee Provisions,
If Any

“On and after
six years from
the date the
program is
implemented, on
an annual basis,
expenditures
from the
administrative
fund shall not
exceed more
than 1 percent of
the total
program fund.”
CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 100004
(West 2018).
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“Fiduciary Duty. The Board, the
individual members of the Board,
the trustee appointed under
subsection (b) of Section 30, any
other agents appointed or engaged
by the Board, and all persons
serving as Program staff shall
discharge their duties with respect
to the Program solely in the interest
of the Program's enrollees and
beneficiaries as follows:
(1) for the exclusive purposes of
providing benefits to enrollees and
beneficiaries and defraying
reasonable expenses of
administering the Program;
(2) by investing with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the
prevailing circumstances that a
prudent person acting in a like
capacity and familiar with those
matters would use in the conduct of
an enterprise of a like character and
with like aims; and
(3) by using any contributions paid
by employees and employers into
the trust exclusively for the
purpose of paying benefits to the
enrollees of the Program, for the
cost of administration of the
Program, and for investments made
for the benefit of the Program.”
820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 80/25
(West 2018).
No reference to fiduciary
obligations.
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No fiduciary
obligations for
participating
employers. 820
ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 80/75 (West
2018).

“The Board
shall keep total
annual expenses
as low as
possible, but in
no event shall
they exceed
0.75% of the
total trust
balance.”
820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN.
80/30 (West
2018).

No reference to
fiduciary
obligations for
participating
employers.

“The Board will
charge each IRA
a Program
administrative
fee not to
exceed the rate
of 1.05% per
annum, to
defray the costs
of operating the
Program,
including
internal and
external
administration,
and operational
and investment
costs, including
for professional
investment
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management
services.”
OR. ADMIN. R.
170-080-0045
(2018).

WA

No fiduciary obligations for state
agencies. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.330.730 (West 2018).

Traditional
ERISA
obligations apply
to any ERISAcovered plans.
WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §
43.330.730 (West
2018).

“Financial
services firms
… may not
charge the
participating
employer an
administrative
fee and may not
charge enrollees
more than one
hundred basis
points in total
annual fees….”
WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §
43.330.735
(West 2018).

MA

As the plan sponsor, the State
Treasurer assumes ERISA
fiduciary obligations.

No specific
guidance in the
statute or
regulations, but
under ERISA,
participating
employers in
multipleemployer plans
retain fiduciary
responsibility for
selecting and
monitoring the
MEP provider.80

No fee caps set
forth in
applicable
statute or
regulations.

“The Plan is created and
maintained and shall be
administered pursuant to the
applicable sections of the
ERISA….”960 MASS. CODE REGS.
6.03 (2018).

The programs described in Table 1 vary along three primary
governance dimensions: (1) whether fiduciary obligations are explicitly
imposed on the state either as a matter of state law or federal law; (2)
whether participating employers are subject to fiduciary obligations either

80. See generally Colleen E. Medill, Regulating ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA L. REV.
505 (2017).
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as a matter of state or federal law;81 and (3) whether the statutory
framework for the state program imposes any kind of fee caps or ceilings
on administrative, investment, or total fees.
California and Illinois have embraced a model where the state serves
as a facilitator of the automatic enrollment programs. Both states
explicitly impose fiduciary obligations on the state agencies and
administrators tasked with implementing and overseeing the plans. Both
states likewise make clear that the programs do not impose fiduciary
obligations on the participating employers. And both embrace explicit fee
caps. The Oregon program offers the same kind of automatic enrollment
IRA and also imposes fee caps, but the state statutes lack any explicit
references to fiduciary obligations for state administrators of the program.
Washington state explicitly disavows fiduciary obligations for the state
agencies that oversee the certification and review of plans for
Washington’s marketplace. Several of the plans available on the
marketplace, however, are traditional 401(k) plans that, if adopted, would
subject participating employers to all obligations under ERISA. In
addition to the traditional fiduciary obligations, however, the Washington
program imposes a fee cap for all plans that wish to be included on the
marketplace. Finally, the state of Massachusetts plan places the state
Treasurer’s office in the role of plan sponsor under ERISA. Pursuant to
the Massachusetts arrangement, participating non-profit employers would
retain some fiduciary responsibility for the selection and oversight of the
plan sponsor.
As states continue to experiment with ways to promote retirement
security,82 the new programs will pave the way for important empirical
analyses of the different models, all of which depart from the traditional

81. Ultimately, the research findings on the impact of fiduciary obligations in state-administered
retirement programs will have implications for the governance of other state-administered programs, most
notably 529 College Savings Plans. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 15, at 133 (“In short, as compared with
401(k), plans and IRAs, college savings plans promise a best-of-both-worlds approach. With college
savings plans, investors benefit from curated menus, economies of scale, disinterested boards, and a
competitive marketplace in which investors have outside options. All that is missing is a serious fiduciary
liability regime in the style of ERISA.”).
82. For a description of different programs, see generally Ctr. for Ret. Initiatives, McCourt Sch.
of Pub. Policy, Georgetown Univ., State Facilitated Retirement Savings Programs, supra note 2. States
like Minnesota, for example, are experimenting with a “carrot and stick” approach that combines an
automatic enrollment IRA plan (“IRAP”) with a state-sponsored multiple-employer plan (MEP). As in
Illinois, “IRAP would require every eligible employer in the state to automatically deduct a percentage of
payroll from worker's paychecks and remit it to an individual account held in trust by the plan. The worker
is free to opt out of the program at any time but initially the employer must automatically enroll the worker
and remit payment unless the worker opts out.” Employers could avoid the requirement to enroll in IRAP
by either establishing their own employer-sponsored plans or by enrolling the state’s MEP. As in
Massachusetts, the MEP “is an ERISA compliant qualified 401(k)-type defined contribution plan” See,
e.g., Chad Burkitt, A More Secure Choice: Minnesota's Two-Pronged Approach to State Level Retirement
Savings Programs, 40 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL'Y & PRAC. 183, 201–03 (2019).
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ERISA framework by introducing a role for the states in the provision of
retirement savings plans for U.S. workers in the private sector.83 Will the
states be better suited to carry out the oversight and administrative
functions than individual employers? Will they be more vigilant if faced
with fiduciary obligations? And how will any fiduciary standards interact
with fee rules? Will such rules serve as the ceiling on plan fees, or as both
a ceiling and a floor?
A comparison of enrollment rates and total plan fees will help shed
light on such challenging questions in the coming years.84 In particular,
the comparison of California and Illinois plans with the Oregon plan will
offer first insights on the effectiveness of state statutory provisions that
explicitly impose fiduciary obligations on state actors. The comparison of
traditional employer-sponsored plans (outside any state-administered
system) to those in the Washington marketplace will provide information
on the effectiveness of fee caps and state certification in determining the
total plan fees for employer-sponsored plans. A comparison of terms of
the 401(k) plans available through the Washington marketplace with
those of the multiple-employer plan sponsored by Massachusetts will
shed light on the effectiveness of the state (versus private sector
employers) as the plan sponsors under an ERISA fiduciary regime, and
on the role of explicit fee caps in controlling total all-in fees.
CONCLUSION
Forty-five years have passed since the historic passage of ERISA.
Since that time, the very nature of retirement savings in the U.S. has
evolved. Defined contribution plans have taken the place of traditional
pensions and are now a core component of the retirement system. Yet the
ERISA regulatory framework was not designed for such plans. Many of
its rules have simply become irrelevant over time, and much of the
governance burden has fallen on the statute’s trust-based fiduciary
83. Scholars have noted that there is, at present, considerable uncertainty and debate over the
effectiveness of the regulatory approaches adopted by the states. Moore, Closing the Retirement Savings
Gap, supra note 2, at 70 (arguing that “[w]hether the states’ rules/cap-based approach to fees is likely to
be more effective than the standards-based approach currently used in private and public-sector pensions
is an empirical question with no ready answer. Moreover, whether administrative fees can, in fact, be kept
low depends on a host of factors such the size of the program, the structure of the program, and who
administers the program.”); see also Nari Rhee, Lessons from California, Connecticut, and Oregon: How
Plan Design Considerations Shape the Financial Feasibility of State Auto-IRAs,” State Brief 16-03, Ctr.
for Ret. Initiatives, McCourt Sch. of Pub. Policy, Georgetown Univ. (2016),
https://cri.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Policy-Brief-16-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW6LPK2P] (identifying the critical drivers of plan costs and providing long-term fee projections).
84. Of course, the variation in the fiduciary and fee provisions described here is only part of the
story. Success of the new programs – at least as measured by participation rates and plan fees – will also
depend on program design, plan size, and board composition.
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standards. The shortcomings of the current regime have manifested both
in the proliferation of suboptimal employer-sponsored plans, and in the
lack of access to any employer-sponsored plans for some forty million
U.S. workers.
In recent years and with increasing speed, state governments have
stepped in to fill gaps in retirement plan access for private-sector
employees.85 The state programs in California, Illinois, Oregon,
Washington, and Massachusetts represent the range of new experiments
in plan governance, with states currently embracing fee caps as either a
complement to or substitute for fiduciary obligations for plan
administrators. This Essay situates the new programs in the historical
context and provides a typology of the state approaches to retirement plan
governance. Measuring the effectiveness of such state programs over the
coming years will offer scholars and policymakers important insights on
the ideal role of federal, state, and local governments in the U.S.
retirement system, and on the combination of rules and standards most
likely to ensure retirement security for U.S. workers.

85. See Bradford, More States Jumping onto Secure Choice Bandwagon, supra note 36 (observing
that “[s]ince 2012, 43 states have either considered or enacted legislation to study or begin implementing
state-facilitated retirement savings programs for their private-sector workers not already covered,” with
2019 “busier than ever” and with 2020 beginning with “legislative activity in 17 states and at least seven
states actively studying how to implement a program”).
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